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Abstract 
 
Traffic accidents are one of the leading causes of injury and death in the U.S. The role of 
traffic law enforcement in the reduction of accidents has been studied by relatively few 
papers and with mixed results that may be due to a simultaneity problem. Traffic law 
enforcement may reduce accidents, but police are also likely to be stricter in accident-
prone areas. We use municipal budgetary shortfalls as an instrumental variable to identify 
the effect of traffic citations on traffic safety and show that budgetary shortfalls lead to 
more frequent issuance of tickets to drivers.  Using a panel of municipalities in 
Massachusetts, we show that increases in the number of tickets written reduce motor 
vehicle accidents and accident related injuries, and that tickets issued to younger drivers 
have  a larger effect in reducing accidents. The findings show that failure to control for 
endogeneity results in a significant underestimation of the positive impact of law 
enforcement on traffic safety. 
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I. Introduction 
Traffic accidents remain one of the leading causes of injury and death in the 
United States. Placed in a public health context, motor vehicle accidents are the 9th 
leading cause of death in the United States, with a mortality rate of 15.3 per 100,000 
population (Heron 2007; Miniño, Heron et al. 2007). The average driver has a one in 
fifteen chance of being involved in a traffic accident during a given year. 1 A wide range 
of social scientists, including economists, has long studied the efficacy of policies, such 
as speed limits and mandatory seat belt use, intended to improve traffic safety.2 The 
impact of these policies, however, is contingent on the enforcement of their associated 
laws and relatively few papers examine the effect of law enforcement on automobile 
accidents (McCarthy 1999; Redelmeier, Tibshirani et al. 2003).  
Rational choice predicts that as officers issue more tickets to drivers operating in 
violation of the law, drivers respond to the increasing cost of breaking the law by driving 
more safely.3 This model predicts that ticketing leads to fewer motor vehicle accidents.4 
However, to date there is little evidence on whether and by how much enforcement 
reduces accidents. Only a handful of studies address this issue.5 Results of existing 
                         
1
 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Traffic Safety Facts Report, 2001.  
2
 These policies include mandatory seat belt use (Loeb 1995), air bags (Kneuper and Yandle 1994; Levitt 
and Porter 2001), the speed limit (Forester, McNown et al. 1984), motorcycle helmet laws (Jones and 
Bayer 2007), the drinking age (Asch and Levy 1990), and vehicle safety inspections (Merrell, Poitras et al. 
1999). 
3
 Rat ional choice models predict that the levels of enforcement and punishment for traffic vio lations are 
based on the degree of infringement by the offending party, the marginal returns to local safety, and the 
costs of enforcement (Becker 1968; Lee 1985; Po linsky and Shavell 1992; Ehrlich 1996) . 
4
 In a survey conducted by Williams et al.(1995) asking drivers how different factors motivated them to 
practice safe driv ing habits, 61 percent of respondents said concern that they may receive a traffic fines 
motivated them “a lot,” ranking only behind potential accidents (82 percent) and potential increase in 
insurance premiums (63 percent).  
5
 Using data from Canada, Redelmeier et al. (1995), found a negative short term effect of traffic citation on 
the likelihood of being involved which vanished after three months.  These authors’ simultaneous 
determination of accidents and citations may have led them to underestimate of the effect (p. 2181).  
McCarthy (1999) found that traffic arrests are negatively correlated with fatal accidents. More recent 
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studies on the effects of law enforcement have been called into question because they 
have not satisfactorily addressed the issue that enforcement and traffic accidents are 
simultaneously determined  (Elvik 2002; Blais and Dupont 2005).  For example, while 
stricter enforcement may reduce accidents, stricter enforcement may also be a response to 
higher accidents rates.  That is, officers issue more fines in cities and in pockets of time 
identified with unsafe driving behavior and higher accident rates. In this case, ordinary 
least square estimation will not identify a causal effect of enforcement on accidents. Not 
controlling for the simultaneous determination of enforcement and accidents leads to a 
biased estimate, and thus an underestimation of the effect of enforcement.6   
To examine the effect of traffic law enforcement on accidents we use a panel of 
municipality level monthly traffic accident and traffic stop data in over 300 towns in 
Massachusetts.  We study a 21 months period, between 2001 and 2003. We control for 
omitted variables with month and municipality fixed effects and address the concern of 
time varying omitted variables with instrumental variable estimation. Our instrument is 
the financial health of a town, measured by whether a town asks voters to approve a 
property tax override referendum. An override referendum allows towns to collect more 
revenues than stipulated by Proposition 2 ½. By putting an override referendum in front 
of voters, the town board indicates that the town is in financial distress and that they 
would like to raise additional revenue.   
When towns are in a financial distress, government officials have an incentive to 
seek extra revenues not only through an increase in property taxes, but also by increasing 
                                                                         
innovations in enforcement, such as red light and speed cameras, as well as driver intoxication checkpoints 
have also been studied (for a review of this literature, see Blais and Dupont 2005). 
6
 Similar simultaneity issues arise in the study of police and deterrence of crimes  (Lev itt 1997; Lev itt 
2002). 
3 
 
fines. One potential source of fines are traffic tickets. We document that when towns seek 
extra revenues through override referenda, police officers in that town issue more traffic 
fines and that our instrument has a statistically significant impact on traffic tickets.  
Because municipalities are small in Massachusetts, many drivers are out of town 
drivers. The median town area is only 20.5 square miles, over 78 percent of all accidents 
involve an out of town driver.  When the fiscal situation is tight, municipal governments 
can turn to out of town drivers for increasing town revenues by increasing the probability 
of a fine for stopped out of town drivers. This motivates the use of an alternative 
instrument which allows us to examine whether the results are sensitive to the chosen 
instrumental variables. This alternative instrument is the number of stopped out of town 
drivers in cities with financial distress.7  We find that in town with financial distress 
police officers are more likely to issue a ticket than a warning to out of town drivers. This 
behavior increases the number of tickets.8 Since these decisions to issue additional tickets 
is uncorrelated with crashes, the number of stopped out of town drivers in towns in 
financial distress is a suitable alternative instrument. 
We demonstrate that the OLS estimator reveals a positive correlation between 
tickets and crashes.  OLS estimation including town and month fixed effects shows a 
negative correlation between tickets and crashes. Adding instrumental variable 
                         
7
 Massachusetts provides for a invaluable setting for our study not just because of the Proposition 2 ½ 
budget institution, but also because of its 351 municipalities div iding what is, at 10,000 square miles, the 6
th
 
smallest state in the United States, into local towns with a median area of only 20.5 square miles. As a 
result, there is a relatively s mall radius from a driver’s home (approximately 2.5 miles for a resident of the 
median town) that he or she is actually driv ing “in town.” In our two years of traffic stops (including stops 
that result in tickets and those that do not), 63% of all stopped drivers are not local residents. A recent 
survey by Progressive Auto Insurance of 11,000 policyholders found that 77% of accidents happened more 
than two miles from their customer’s home (Insurance.com 2007), which in Massachusetts would place the 
bulk of accident participants outside of their home municipality.  
8
 These results are consistent with other recent work showing that towns in financial decline use traffic 
tickets as a revenue generation tool (Helland and Tabarrok 2002; Makowsky and Stratmann 2008) . 
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estimation, using the Proposition 2 ½ related instruments, we document that tickets  
reduce car crashes and that the magnitude of this effect is nearly three times larger than in 
the OLS estimation. Further, we document that more enforcement reduces injuries and 
associated with traffic accidents. Results regarding fatalities show a negative correlation 
with enforcement, but are less conclusive.  
We further explore how ticketing reduces traffic accidents, namely whether 
tickets given to a population commonly associated with riskier behavior have a larger 
effect on reducing accidents than tickets issued to less risky populations. We divide the 
sample by age and find that the traffic ticket effect is larger for those under the age of 
thirty.  
 
II. Background on Institutions and Officer Strictness 
In 1980 Massachusetts voters passed referendum Proposition 2 ½, which placed 
limits on both the maximum amount of revenue generated through property taxation by 
Massachusetts municipalities and the amount by which any municipality may increase 
this revenue from one year to the next. If a town government wishes to raise funds from 
property taxes beyond the levy limit prescribed by Proposition 2 ½, it has the option to 
pass an “override” referendum. An override referendum can be proposed and placed on 
an electoral ballot by a majority vote of the town board of selectmen (aldermen). The 
override question must be presented in dollar terms and specify the purpose of the 
additional funds. Passage of the override requires a majority vote of approval by the 
electorate (Massachusetts Department of Revenue 2001).  
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Evidence suggests that while limits on personal property taxation have curtailed 
spending (Cutler, Elmendorf et al. 1999; Bradbury, Mayer et al.), they have also made 
Massachusetts local governments more dependent on other local sources of revenues. 9 
Galles and Sexton (1998), for example, suggest that increases in non-tax revenue may 
have returned spending to pre-Proposition 2 ½ levels. Non-property tax revenues include 
receipts from the motor vehicle excise, charges for services, departmental revenue (e.g. 
libraries), licenses and permits, and fines. Traffic citations fall under the category of 
fines.10 
There are limitations, however, placed on revenue generated from fees, licenses, 
and permits. Municipalities are allowed only to recover one hundred percent of the cost 
of providing fee-based services.11 In contrast, no statute or regulation limits revenue 
accrued from fines. Municipalities retain 50 percent of the revenues collected from traffic 
fines issued in their jurisdictions.12 The remainder is allocated to the state treasury and 
                         
9
 “Since the passage of Proposition 2 ½ in 1980, municipal budgeting has been revenue driven…Therefore, 
at the start of the annual budget process, a community should review its  four major sources of revenue – tax 
levy, state aid, local estimated receipts, and available funds…However, because of the constraints of 
Proposition 2 ½, recent fluctuations in state aid, and the depletion of local reserves, communities have 
become more aware of local receipts as a source of needed funds.” – (Division of Legal accessed January 
23, 2006) 
10
  (Massachusetts Department of Revenue, Division of Local Services official Budget Control Worksheet 
for Local Receipts http://www.d ls.state.ma.us/publ/misc/umas.pdf, accessed January 23, 2006) 
11
 Some municipalit ies choose to recover only direct costs, while others include “indirect” costs as well, 
such as administrative and debt management costs. 
12 “Fines imposed under the provisions of chapters eighty-nine and ninety, including fines, penalties and 
assessments imposed under the provisions of chapter ninety C for the vio lation of the provisions of chapters 
eighty-nine and ninety, fines assessed by a hearing officer of a city or town as defined in sections twenty A 
and twenty A 1/2 of chapter ninety and forfeitures imposed under the provisions of section one hundred and 
forty-one of chapter one hundred and forty, shall be paid over to the treasury of the city or town wherein 
the offense was committed; provided, however, that only fifty per cent of the amount of fines, penalties and 
assessments collected for v iolations of section seventeen of chapter ninety or of a special speed regulation 
lawfully made under the authority of section eighteen of said chapter ninety shall be paid over to the 
treasury of the city or town wherein the offense was committed and the remaining fifty per cent shall be 
paid over to the state treasurer and credited to the Highway Fund. “(Massachusetts State Law. Part IV, Title 
II, Chapter 280, Section 2.) 
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the Highway Fund. Because towns can keep half of the revenues from traffic tickets, this 
revenue can serve as a substitute for property tax revenue.  
When a municipal government faces a budgetary shortfall, that is, revenue 
expectations fall short of desired spending, it has the option of calling for a Proposition 2 
½ override referendum.  A referendum’s wording includes the total amount of additional 
local property tax revenue government officials will collect and the manner in which the 
additional revenue will be spent. The referendum is subject to a majority-rule vote open 
to all local voters. The failure of an override referendum reduces funds that would have 
otherwise been available for the designated fiscal year. Failure of a referendum is likely 
to make local officials more eager to pursue alternative sources of revenue.  
Officers have the discretion to issue a warning, which carries neither a fine nor 
points for the driver’s record. 13, 14 Makowsky and Stratmann (2009) show in a cross-
section that failure to pass an override referendum increases officer strictness.15 In these 
towns officers issue fewer warnings and more tickets to out of town drivers. Officers can 
exercise this discretion, because in Massachusetts it is up to an officer’s judgment 
whether to issue a fine or a warning for traffic infractions. For example, when a police 
officer stops a driver for driving in excess of the speed limit, the officer is not obligated 
to issue the driver a citation and a fine.   
 
                         
13
 Officers’ use of discretion under Massachusetts General Law Part I Chapter 90C Section 3 was recently 
challenged by the Newton (MA) Police Association. Their appeal was ruled against by the Massachusetts 
State Court of Appeals, protecting the capacity of officers to issue warnings, NEWTON POLICE 
ASSOCIATION vs. POLICE CHIEF OF NEWTON (Massachusetts State Court of Appeals, 6/9/2005) 
14
 During the time period studied in this paper (2001 to 2003) the Massachusetts police did not keep exp licit 
records of warnings, Rather, we exclude records of stops in which a fine of zero dollars was recorded as 
warnings, counting only stops where the driver was issued a fine as tickets.   
15
 Makowsky and Stratmann (2008) show this in a cross section for a two month period. These findings are 
consistent with the results by (Garrett and Wagner 2008) who find that officers in North Caro lina issue 
more tickets in the year after a decline in county revenue.  
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III. Data and Empirical Methods 
 The Massachusetts legislature required the collection of data from traffic stops 
between April 1, 2001 and January 31, 2003.  These data include information on every 
traffic stop in Massachusetts during this time. Data include whether a stopped driver 
received a ticket or a warning16, the driver’s age, place of residence, gender, and the type 
of infraction, including miles per hour over the speed limit when it was a speeding related 
offense.17  
 The Massachusetts Highway Department and Highway Safety Division collects 
accident data in its Crash Data System (CDS). CDS data include all reported accidents 
involving property damage in excess of $1,000 to any vehicle or other property, a fatality 
or injury. Reports are submitted to the Registry of Motor Vehicles (RMV) by police, 
agencies, and drivers who are involved in accidents that qualify. Accidents include 
collisions with objects, pedestrians, and other vehicles. We obtained accident data from 
the CDS from April 1, 2001 to January 31, 2003, the time span for which traffic ticket 
data are available. 
 The daily accident data and daily traffic stop data consist of reports from each 
individual traffic accident and stop. A recorded accident event always involves at least 
one automobile. While an event always represents a single “crash,” an event may account 
for multiple (or zero) injuries or fatalities. For each municipality we aggregated to the 
month the accidents and number of traffic tickets, so that our unit of observation is the 
                         
16
 In this data set warnings are not explicitly labeled and we categorize all observations with a fine of zero 
dollars as warnings. These observations account for 46 percent of observations, similar to 48 percent 
warning rate observed in a subset of the data wherein warn ings are explicitly labeled.  
17 Traffic stop data was collected by Massachusetts State legislature, and provided to us by Bill Dedman of 
the Boston Globe and MSNBC.com.  
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total number of tickets and accidents per month in each municipality. The rationale for 
the aggregation to the month level is that some of our control variables are based on the 
fiscal year, such as which fiscal year is affected by the passage or failure of the override 
referendum, while other controls are based on the annual year, such as unemployment.18  
Our measure for traffic law enforcement is the sum of tickets issued by local 
officers that are related to traffic safety.19  Parking tickets, for example, are not included 
in this data set.  Table A1 in the appendix shows the types of violations that resulted in a 
ticket.  The most commonly issued tickets are for speeding, comprising 39 percent of all 
tickets. The next most common are tickets issued for seat belt violations (13 percent) and 
failure to stop (12 percent).  
Figure 1 plots the mean number of crashes and tickets over time. The first month 
in the figure is April 2001 and the last month is January 2003. The figure shows no strong 
pattern suggesting that traffic tickets reduce car accidents. In November 2002 the number 
of tickets reaches its maximum. This maximum is not due to any one town issuing many 
tickets in that month, but instead reflects a uniform increase in ticketing in all towns. 
To control for other factors that affect car accidents, besides tickets, we estimate 
the regression 
 
 (1) Accidentsit= β0 + β1Ticketsit + β2StoppedDrivers it + β3MunicipalityXit + 
Municipalityi + Montht  + εit 
                         
18
 We also could have collapse the data to quarters or weeks. However, we have two incomplete quarters, 
and using a month as a unit of observation allows us to have complete data for each observation. Further, 
when using months instead of weeks, we have fewer zeros in the dependent variables, and thus the month 
unit makes ordinary least squares a defensible estimat ion method.  
19
 We focus on local officers because of our instrumental variab le strategy: local officers have an incentive 
to react to a budgetary shortfall o f the municipality because they are employed by the town, while state 
troopers are employed by the state. 
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The accidents and tickets variables in equation (1) measure how many traffic 
crashes and tickets were recorded in municipality i during month t. Depending on the 
specification, accidents is either the number of crashes or the number of crashes per 
capita. The vector StoppedDrivers it   includes the number of stopped drivers from out of 
town, and their characteristics, that is, the fraction of stopped drivers that are minority 
drivers, female drivers, the average age of a stopped driver, and the average speed that 
was recorded on the ticket or warning issued when the driver was stopped for driving in 
excess of the limit.20 MunicipalityXit  is a vector of municipal characteristics. This vector 
includes population, Chapter 90 highway and road funding from the state, the property 
value per capita, and road safety related expenditures (not including spending on police 
and fire departments) per capita. These variables vary by fiscal year. The vector also 
includes the number of unemployment filings, and the number of registered vehicles per 
capita, which are measured for each calendar year.21 Because our unit of observation is 
the month, we attribute the data that come by fiscal year to the months associated to that 
fiscal year and proceed similarly for calendar year data. To account for other sources of 
heterogeneity across municipalities that are constant over time, we include fixed effects 
for each municipality (Municipalityi) and month (Montht).
22 We cluster standard errors 
by municipality in all specifications.  
                         
20
 Data on average monthly characteristics of all drivers in a town are not available. Instead, we use the data 
for those drivers who were stopped in the municipality by the local police. These are the data included in 
the StoppedDrivers variab le. To the extent that characteristics of drivers who have accidents are likely to be 
more similar to those of stopped drivers  than to all drivers, characteristics of stopped drivers may be a 
better measure than the unavailable measure of average driver characteristics. 
21 Municipal data, including records of override referendum votes and their outcomes, are from the 
Massachusetts Department of Revenue.  
22
 There is no perfect collinearity between the month indicators and the annual municipality based variables 
because the latter vary by municipality.  
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 The availability of detailed data on traffic tickets dictates the time period of our 
analysis. Our data span over 3 fiscal years and three calendar years. A fiscal year in 
Massachusetts runs from July 1st to June 30th. For example, the fiscal year 2002 runs from 
July 1st 2001 until June 30th 2002. We have 3 months of data from fiscal year 2001 
(4/1/2001 to 6/31/2001), 12 months from fiscal year 2002 (7/1/2001 to 6/31/2002), and 6 
months from fiscal year 2003 (7/1/2002 to 1/31/2003). With OLS, the tickets variable 
is likely to be correlated with the error term, εit, resulting in biased estimates. The reason 
for the endogeneity is an omitted variable bias:  in towns where drivers drive recklessly, 
many tickets are issued and many crashes occur. Thus OLS will underestimate the true 
effect of tickets on accidents. The inclusion of municipal fixed effects alleviates some of 
the omitted variable problem because it accounts for town specific factors that 
simultaneously affect tickets and crashes.  However, fixed effects cannot control for time-
varying omitted variables that are specific to the municipality. An example of such a 
variable is a local event, which may be associated with both more traffic tickets and 
accidents. To address this issue we use as an instrument whether a town is in financial 
distress.  Traffic tickets are one source of revenues and city officials have an incentive to 
seek more funds through traffic fines when the fiscal situation is bleak (Makowsky and 
Stratmann 2009).  
 Our measure of fiscal distress is whether a town puts an override referendum in 
front of voters and whether it failed or passed. A referendum can be held at anytime 
during the year.  In our data referenda occur at a higher frequency in the spring, but they 
are held almost all times of the year. The wording of the referendum has to be specific in 
11 
 
that it says how much money is requested and for what purpose the money will be used.  
Further, the referendum always applies to the following fiscal year.   
Our first stage regression is 
(2) Ticketsit  = β0 +β1Override it + β2StoppedDrivers it + β3MunicipalityXit + 
Municipalityi + Montht + μit 
 
With this equation we test whether towns that are in a financial crunch are more likely to 
issue tickets to increase local revenues.  The Override vector includes an indicator 
variables for whether a override referendum passed (OverridePassit) during the fiscal 
year, whether the referendum failed (OverrideFailit), as well as separate measures for the 
total dollar amounts requested when an override referendum failed ($OverrideFailit) and 
when it passed ($OverridePassit).
23  We include the OverridePassit variable in addition to 
the OverrideFailit variable because excluding the former would lump towns with no 
override referendum together with towns that had a successful referendum. We include 
$OverridePassit and $OverrideFailit, because the dollar amount of the increase in property 
tax revenue requested by the local offers a measure of the magnitude of fiscal distress.   
 A strong indicator that a town is fiscally healthy, with regard to revenues, is the 
absence of an override referendum vote. When local officials call for an override 
referendum, they are indicating an anticipated revenue shortfall. When a called override 
referendum fails, town officials may try to collect revenues via alternative means, such as 
traffic tickets. If a town tries to collect extra traffic ticket revenues when an override 
referendum fails, the estimated coefficient on failed override referenda will be positive. 
                         
23
 In a handful of instances, multip le referenda were called within town during the same fiscal year, with 
some passing and others failing. Due to the ambiguity of this outcome, these observations were dropped 
from the analysis.  
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Even if the override vote passes, however, there is reason to believe that towns will issue 
more tickets, and the estimated coefficient on passed override referenda will be positive 
as well. While likely better off than if the override vote had failed, towns that pass an 
override are less fiscally sound relative to towns whose revenues were sufficient to begin 
with and did not need to call for an override referendum. Further, towns that pass an 
override referendum have raised only the additional revenue to support exactly what was 
enumerated in the request for additional tax revenue, leaving no slack for underestimated 
and unanticipated expenses. Town officials may believe that larger requests are less 
likely to pass and therefore may ask for only a fraction of their desired amounts in the 
referendum. Regardless of whether an override passes or fails, larger dollar amount 
requests indicate greater fiscal distress, suggesting that the estimated coefficient on the 
dollar amounts of passed and failed override referenda will be positive.  
In the second stage regression, the first stage controls for town specific 
characteristics via town fixed effects. Therefore, the effect of override referenda is 
identified by changes in whether a town asked for tax increases through referenda. 
Failure to approve an override referendum may affect traffic accidents via other avenues 
than tickets. Towns where a referendum fails may shift funds from street maintenance or 
other projects related to public safety to other areas. Worse street maintenance, pedestrian 
pathways, or public signage, could lead to an increase in accidents. To address this issue 
we control in our regression for spending on road maintenance and other public safety 
spending.24 To the extent that these variables do not control for all road maintenance 
activities, there will be a bias against a finding that more enforcement reduces traffic 
accidents.  
                         
24
 Our “other public safety” spending measure does not include spending on police and fire departments . 
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IV. Results 
Table 1 gives descriptive statistics for the data.  In our data set there are on 
average 37 car accidents per month per town, ranging from zero accidents during a month 
in a few towns to 674 in Worcester in the month of October 2001.  All recorded accidents 
involve at least one automobile.  For 409 observations, or less than 6 percent of the 
observations the traffic accident variable has a value of zero.  The injury variable equals 
zero for 16 percent of the sample used, fatalities equals zero for 90%.  The mean number 
of tickets is 82, and for less than one percent of the sample zero tickets were recorded in a 
given month.  
The override failure variable takes the value of one for 2.4 percent of the sample, 
and includes 18 of the 338 towns included in the sample. The override pass variable takes 
the value of one for 9 percent of the sample, representing 69 of all towns analyzed. 
Towns where all referenda failed asked for an average total of $1,327,761, while towns 
where all referenda passed received an average of $1,031,709.  
Table 2 shows the effect of our measures for fiscal distress on the number of 
tickets issued. Column 1 contains the dummy failed overrides, passed overrides, the 
dollar amount requested in all passed referenda, and the dollar amount in failed referenda. 
The second column mirrors the first with respect to the excluded instruments, but adds 
variables controlling for relevant town and driver characteristics. Column 2 is first stage 
for the regression results in Table 3, column 3. We include the first column of Table 2 to 
show that the effect of fiscal distress on ticket giving is robust to whether or not time-
varying municipality and driver characteristics are included in the specification. All 
14 
 
regressions have month and town fixed effects, and we cluster standard errors at the town 
level. 
In Table 2, column 2 shows that the coefficient on the dollar amount associated 
with failed referenda is positive and significant, while the coefficient on override failure 
indicator is positive, but not statistically significant. This shows that the larger the 
amount asked for and rejected by voters, the larger the number of tickets issued.  The 
point estimate on the passage of an override referendum shows that passage leads to a 
drop in the number of tickets written by 15.7 tickets, but that with each $100,000 increase 
in the amount asked for in the referendum, another 2.1 tickets are written.  This implies 
that a passed override referendum leads to fewer tickets when the amount asked for was 
below $750,000 and that the number of tickets issued increases for higher amounts. 25 In 
our data sample, 30 percent of passed referendum were for requests in excess of 
$750,000, and thus resulted in additional tickets being issued.  
While the positive coefficient on $OverridePassit is in line with our predictions, 
the negative sign on OverridePassit is different than expected. The total effect of a passed 
override with a large price tag, when considering coefficients on both OverridePassit  and 
$OverridePassit, however, is consistent with our hypothesis.   The results in column 2 
suggest that passage of overrides requesting large dollar amounts correspond to 
significant fiscal distress leading to more tickets issued. Smaller passed overrides, 
however, appear to alleviate the fiscal pressure to pursue alternative revenues, and in turn 
correspond to fewer tickets.  
                         
25
 We have 661observations where the override referendum passed.  For these observations the mean 
(standard deviation) dollar amount asked for in the referendum was $ 1,020,783 ( 1,626,738). For failed 
override referenda we have 171 observations with a mean (standard deviation) of $1,327,761 (3,425,252).  
15 
 
Table 2, column 2 shows that the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic is 14.06 for the 
excluded instruments. This indicates that the outcome of the override referenda and their 
associated dollar amounts are strong instruments and that the use of these instruments 
results only in a small bias of two stage lest squares.26  For example, a five percent bias is 
associated with a Kleibergen-Paap F statistic of 16.85 (ten percent with an F statistic of 
10) (see Stock and Yogo 2005). The Anderson-Rubin Wald test offers a more robust test 
of the potential weakness of instruments, especially for models, such as ours, which use a 
large number of excluded variables to identify a single endogenous variable (Stock, 
Wright et al. 2002). The Anderson-Rubin null hypothesis that the excluded variables 
coefficients equal zero can be rejected at the less than 1 percent level in all IV 
specifications used in this paper.  
Table 3 reports the results from examining the determinants of automobile 
accidents.  When estimating the regression without town fixed effects, but including 
month effects, the point estimate is positive, and statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level (Table 3, column 1).27  These findings are likely due to the omitted variable bias 
indicated previously: in dangerous towns, more tickets are issues and more automobile 
accidents occur. Column 2 controls for such town specific and time invariant factors via 
town fixed effects as well as month effects. Now the coefficient on tickets is negative and 
statistically significant, indicating that OLS without town fixed effects underestimates the 
effectiveness of traffic law enforcement on accidents. The point estimate in column 2 
implies that 100 extra tickets lead to 5.5 fewer car crashes. In our data set the mean 
number of accidents and tickets are 37 and 83 respectively, with standard deviations of 
                         
26
 See Stock and Yogo 2001 for a d iscussion of this issue http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~jstock/pdf/rfa_6.pdf. 
27
 Without month effects the point estimate is positive and statistically significant as well. 
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with a standard deviations of 60 for accidents and 132 for tickets. Thus, the 0.055 point 
estimate implies that a one standard deviation increase in tickets leads to 7 fewer 
accidents, almost 12 percent of the standard deviation in accidents.  
The fixed effects specification does not control for the possibility that dangerous 
behavior ebbs and flows within a municipality, and that law enforcement responds 
accordingly. If changes in dangerous behavior within a town lead to more tickets and 
more accidents, then the coefficient in column 2 is biased upward. Columns 3 of Table 3 
addresses this concern by using the instruments and first stage presented in Table 2, 
column 2.  The bottom panel of the table includes results for overidentifying restrictions 
tests, as well as Kleibergen-Paap and Anderson-Rubin results, as evidence for the validity 
of our instruments. The overidentifying restrictions test does not reject the null-
hypothesis that the instruments are valid.  
The results in column 3 show that, as predicted, the magnitude of the coefficient 
on tickets increases when addressing the endogeneity concerns via instrumental variables. 
Relative to OLS, the coefficient on tickets more than doubles, and suggests that 100 extra 
tickets lead to 14.3 fewer car crashes.  The results from this 2SLS model imply that a one 
standard deviation increase in tickets leads to a reduction of accidents by a third of the 
standard deviation of accidents.  
Table 3, columns 5 through 7 present model the same specifications as in columns 
1 through 4, but with crashes per capita as the dependent variable. The coefficients on 
tickets issued exhibits signs and magnitudes that correspond to the results in columns 1 
through 4. Similar to the previous analysis, the observed coefficient on tickets is positive 
in the OLS specification (column 5), becomes negative when adding municipality fixed 
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effects (column 6), and doubles in magnitude when instrumental variables are added 
(columns 7). The results in columns 7 suggest that for every 1,000 tickets written, there 
are 2.12 fewer accidents per 1,000 population.  This estimate implies that a one standard 
deviation increase in tickets reduces accidents per 1000 capita by 0.28, or 23 percent of a 
standard deviation in per capita accidents.  
Among our control variables, our measure of traffic density, measured as the 
number of registered vehicles per capita has a consistently positive and statistically 
significant effect on crashes in the town fixed effects regressions (Table3, columns 2 and 
3): more density leads to more crashes. In these specifications the point estimates on out 
of town drivers are positive and statistically significant, indicating that towns with more 
out of town drivers have more crashes on their roads. Each additional out of town driver 
is associated with a between 0.04 and 0.06 increase in the number of crashes.  
To examine how our second stage estimates are sensitive to the selection of 
instruments we introduce an alternative set of instruments. This set is motivated by 
politicians’ incentives to tax non voters instead of voters. Politicians have an incentive to 
export taxes because when taxes are levied on local voters, those voters may be less 
likely to vote for them. But this response is not possible for non-voters.  Applying this 
logic to traffic tickets, politicians would prefer to raise traffic ticket revenue from out of 
town drivers instead of local drivers. We will therefore test whether police officers in 
towns that are in financial distress issue more tickets to out of town drivers than to local 
drivers. In these town, stopped out of town drivers who were previously let off with a 
warning will instead receive a ticket when a town is in fiscal distress, implying that the 
threshold of issuing a ticket to out of town drives is lower in towns in financial distress. 
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We will test this hypothesis by including interaction terms between override referenda 
and out of town drivers in our regression. These interaction terms serve as our additional 
instruments. 
 This additional strictness towards out of town drivers can have an impact on 
traffic safety because out of town drivers represent a large fraction of driver volume.  
This is because in Massachusetts, where municipalities average only 20.5 square miles, 
the majority of drivers on roads within a municipal police department’s jurisdiction are 
from out of town. One indicator of such is that the majority of drivers stopped by police 
officers are from out of town. For the time period that we examine in this paper, out of 
town drivers represent sixty-six percent of drivers stopped, and sixty-nine percent of 
drivers issued tickets.28  
There is also some direct evidence out of town drivers are involved in the 
majority of car crashes. For a sub-period of our data set, from January 1, 2002 through 
January 31, 2002 we have data on whether a driver who is involved in an accident is from 
out of town. Earlier data, that is data for the first nine months of our data set, are not 
available.29 Table A2 shows that between January 2002 and January 2004 the number of 
accidents by out of town drivers is roughly proportional to the number of tickets to out of 
town drivers, and that out of town drivers are involved in the vast majority of accidents. 
Seventy-eight percent of all accidents had at least one driver involved who was from out 
                         
28
 The prevalence of out of town drivers is also increased by our exclusion of Boston, whose popu lation 
density far exceeds the rest of the state.  Only 13% of drivers stopped in our sample are from out of state. 
Out of state drivers represent a slightly different set of circumstances because they can, potentially, be 
identified by an officer prior to a stop by their out of state license plate. 
29
 According to Richard Conard from the Massachusetts Department of Highway Traffic Engineering prior 
to 2002 and older accident records computer system was used which did not contain the residence of 
drivers. 
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of town.  Thus, increasing strictness on out of town drivers is in fact an increase in 
strictness on drivers who are primarily involved in crashes.  
 Therefore, our alternative specification for the first stage is  
 
(3) Ticketsit  = β0 +β1Override it + β2Override it * StoppedDriversit + 
β3StoppedDriversit + β4MunicipalityXit + Municipalityi + Montht + μit 
 
where we now interact the Override vector with the number of stopped out of town 
drivers.  Stopped out of town drivers are drivers whose license plate and drivers’ license 
indicates that they are from out of town. It is a count of the number of stopped out of 
town drivers. Some of these drivers have received a ticket, and others a warning.  
 The results from this specification are shown in column 3 and 4 of Table 2. Both 
columns differ in that column 3 excludes control variables that appear in the second stage 
(with the exception of the “out of town drivers stopped” variable) while column 4 does 
not.  Column 4 is the first stage for regressions shown in later tables.  The results in both 
columns lend support to the tax exportation hypothesis. The coefficients on the 
interaction effects between out of town drivers and the override failure indicator and 
between out of town drivers and the override pass dollar amount are positive and 
statistically significant.  The introduction of these interaction effects makes the point 
estimates on the levels of override failure and passage statistically insignificant, 
suggesting that much of the extra ticketing associated with override referendum is due to 
ticketing of out of town drivers.  The findings show that out of town drivers’ likelihood 
of receiving a ticket increases when they drive through towns that had put an override 
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referendum to voters. 30 Relative to column 2 in Table 2 the Kleinbergen-Paap F-statistic 
increases to 18.7, suggesting that our instruments are strong. 
 The second stages for this alternative set of instruments are in Table 3, columns 4 
and 8. The point estimates in the regressions explaining for total number of crashes and 
per capita crashes are very similar to our first set of instruments. For example, the 
previous point estimate on tickets in column 3 was 0.143, and the point estimate on 
tickets in column 4 which uses this alternative set of instruments is 0.145. Further, in both 
specifications the test for overidentifying restrictions indicates that our instruments are 
valid.  
Table 4 analyses the effects of tickets on injuries (column 1 to 4) and on fatalities 
(columns 5 to 8). Injuries and fatalities are measure of the severity of accidents. As for 
accidents, the OLS estimate without municipality fixed effects shows a positive 
coefficient of tickets (Table 4, column 1), but the sign reverses and becomes negative and 
statistically significant when adding municipality fixed effects (Table 4, column 2). For 
fatalities, the sign on tickets also changes from positive to negative when adding town 
fixed effects, and the estimates are not statistically significant in both cases. The 2SLS 
estimates, however, show a negative and statistically significant effect on tickets for the 
number of injuries and fatalities.31 The coefficient on tickets in the injury regression 
doubles from the OLS specification in column 2 to the instrumental variable specification 
in column 3 in Table 4. It indicates that 100 additional tickets lead to 6 fewer injuries 
associated with traffic accidents.  This implies that a one standard deviation in tickets 
                         
30
 Support for our hypothesis that the finding is driven by increasing strictness to stopped out of town 
drivers, rather than by stopping more out of town drivers comes of a regression of the number of stopped 
out of town drivers on measures of fiscal distres s. In these regressions we do not find evidence that more 
out of town drivers are stopped when a town is financially strapped. 
31
 These 2SLS estimates as well as those in the remaining tables have Table 2, column 4 as the first stage. 
The estimates in Table 4 and subsequent tables are very similar when the first stage is Table 2, column 2.  
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reduces injuries by 27 percent of a standard deviation in injuries.  For the injury per 
capita variable as the dependent variable, Table 4, column 4 shows that the point estimate 
on tickets is not statistically significant, although it has the anticipated negative sign. 
Columns 5 to 8 of Table 4 shows the same set of regressions for fatalities. OLS shows a 
negative effect of tickets on fatalities, and 2SLS also shows that tickets reduce fatalities. 
The latter point estimate is statistically significant at the ten percent level.  The 
coefficient on fatalities per capita, however, is not statistically significant, with a positive 
coefficient close to zero.  
To this point, the results show that tickets are an effective means for reducing 
accidents and injuries, while the effects of ticket issuance on fatalities is less conclusive. 
This is likely, in part, because car accidents may result in injuries, but whether they result 
in fatalities as opposed to a serious injury has some randomness to it, and may require a 
larger sample over a longer period of time to find statistically significant effects. 
Fatalities may also be more dependent on driver specific factors, such as whether the 
driver was wearing a seat belt, for which we are unable to control.  
Next, we examine the effect of tickets on a subset of drivers, namely young 
drivers. These drivers are disproportionately represented in traffic accidents for reasons 
of both inexperience and still developing higher-order cognitive skills (Deery 1999). 
Younger drivers on average have lower incomes and in turn greater sensitivity to 
potential fines and associated increases in insurance premiums. Given the greater 
sensitivity of young drivers to costs of receiving a citation, and given that they are 
disproportionately represented in accidents we will test whether tickets issued to drivers 
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under the age of thirty will reduce the number of accidents by a greater amount than 
tickets written to all drivers.  
Table 5 presents the first stage estimates using the number of tickets issued to 
drivers under thirty years of age. The point estimates are smaller in magnitude and the 
significance levels are a little lower than those using the full sample. However, the basic 
findings of Table 2 remain: stopped out of town drivers are more likely to receive a ticket 
when they drive through towns experiencing a budget crunch. The Kleinbergen-Paap F-
statistics are, depending on the specification, 14.5 and 12.1, which suggests the 
instrument remains strong and the bias from using instrumental variables will still be 
relatively small. 
Tables 6 (crashes) and 7 (injuries and fatalities) report model specifications that 
correspond to Tables 3 and 4, but test the impact of only tickets issued to drivers under 
the age of 30. The signs of the results are similar to analysis of the full sample, but with 
larger coefficient magnitudes. The coefficient on tickets in Table 6, column 3 implies that 
a one standard deviation increase in tickets to drivers under the age of 30 (mean 42, 
standard deviation. 63) reduces accidents by 31.8 which is 53 percent of a standard 
deviation in accidents. The results in Table 7, column 3 imply that a one standard 
deviation increase in tickets under the age of 30 reduces injuries by 12.5, or 46 percent of 
a standard deviation in injuries. This effect of ticketing to drivers under 30 is three times 
larger than the effect found in the sample of all drivers. We also find that tickets decrease 
crashes per capita. The coefficient on tickets in Table 6, columns 8, corresponds to five 
fewer accidents per thousand population for every 1000 tickets written.  This estimate 
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implies that a one standard deviation increase in tickets to drivers under 30 reduces 
accidents per 1,000 capita by 0.315 or 41 percent relative to the mean.  
  
V. Conclusion 
This paper shows that traffic fines reduce the number of car accidents and related 
injuries.  We address the endogeneity problem that remains after using town and time 
effects by estimating the fixed effects model with instrumental variab les. Our instrument 
is whether a town asked for more money through an override referendum and it’s 
interaction with stopped out of town drivers. Using panel data, we find that more tickets 
are issued when a town has asked for an override referendum, and that tickets issuance 
increase the more out of town drivers that are stopped, lending support to the tax 
exporting hypothesis while controlling for town fixed effects.  Using these estimates, we 
find that tickets are a far more effective reducer of car accidents and automobile accident 
related injuries than ordinary least square estimation would indicate.  The results from 
this 2SLS model imply that a one standard deviation increase in tickets leads to a 
reduction of accidents by a third of the standard deviation of accidents.  
Arguably, the traffic policy debate with the highest public profile has been the 
speed limit. The push for a fifty-five mile per hour speed limit on all U.S. highways 
centered on the proposition that reducing the average speed of American drivers would 
prevent accidents and save lives (Jondrow, Marianne et al. 1983; Moore, Dolinis et al. 
1995).  Lave (1985), however, offered a different theory, proposing that it is the variance 
of driver speed, and not the mean, that is the leading determinant of traffic safety. Keeler 
(Keeler 1994) has since found additional evidence supporting the Lave’s theory of driver 
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speed variance. The variance of any distribution is sensitive to outliers  (Mosteller and 
Tukey 1977). In the context of driver speed, outliers are by definition breaking the law, 32 
often exceeding the speed limit in great excess. If variance is the key determinant of 
traffic accidents, then the legislated speed limit diminishes in importance, and the level of 
enforcement rises in importance. By punishing drivers exceeding the speed limit, traffic 
tickets can reduce the variance of driver speed, thereby reducing traffic accidents.  
 
  
                         
32
 While we are mainly speaking to outliers on the upper (higher speed) tail of the distribution, outliers in 
the lower tail are often vio lating minimum speed limits, and adding the variance of driver speed as well.  
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Figure 1  
Average number of crashes and tickets across municipalities by month  
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Accidents 36.89 60.25 0 674 
Accidents per 1000 capita 1.77     1.22 0 10.10 
Tickets 82.63 129.01 0 1940 
Tickets to drivers under 30 41.71    62.94 0 947 
Injuries 15.82 27.33 0 315 
Injuries per 1000 capita 0.77     0.72 0 10.30 
Fatalities 0.12 0.39 0 6 
Fatalities per 1000 capita .008    .049  0 1.33 
Out of Town Drivers Stopped 111.48 135.76 0 1678 
Other Public Safety expenditures per 
capita 
28.16 29.74 0.14 310.70 
Average Mph over the speed limit 17.21 2.83 7.50 50.00 
Number of minority drivers stopped 31.49 85.54 0 1271 
Total registered vehicles per capita 1.01 0.18 0.49 2.15 
Chapter 90 Highway funding per mile 3236.21 1005.93 1894.95 11459.58 
Unemployment 491.20 717.93 3 5509 
Property Value ($10,000) per capita 11.40 15.58 1.93 281.89 
Average age of stopped drivers 32.28 4.06 0 69.50 
Population (1000s) 17.99 22.05 0.35 175.71 
Number of female stopped drivers 47.74 74.92 0 795 
Override Pass 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Override Fail 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Failed Referenda Dollars ($100,000) 0.32 5.70 0 176.70 
Passed Referenda Dollars ($100,000) 0.96 5.80 0 117.62 
N= 7,038. All dollars are in 2003 CPI adjusted dollars.   
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Table 2  
Override Referenda and Traffic Tickets 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS  OLS OLS 
Override Pass -20.294** 
(6.122) 
-15.718** 
(3.793) 
 -7.558 
(5.766) 
-7.540 
(5.695) 
Override Fail -6.266 
(7.928) 
1.719 
(4.455) 
 -9.509+ 
(5.670) 
-9.094 
(5.793) 
Override Pass Dollars  2.643** 
(0.532) 
2.091** 
(0.339) 
 0.223 
(0.207) 
0.327 
(0.216) 
Override Fail Dollars  0.067 
(0.048) 
0.091*  
(0.038) 
 0.015 
(0.080) 
0.052 
(0.067) 
Out of Town Drivers Stopped * Override Pass 
  
 0.010 
(0.071) 
0.008 
(0.069) 
Out of Town Drivers Stopped * Override Fail 
  
 0.093+ 
(0.054) 
0.114*  
(0.047) 
Out of Town Drivers Stopped * Override Pass Dollars  
  
 0.004** 
(0.001) 
0.005** 
(0.001) 
Out of Town Drivers Stopped * Override Fail Dollars  
  
 0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Out of Town Drivers Stopped 
 
0.247** 
(0.071) 
 0.525** 
(0.065) 
0.237** 
(0.072) 
Other Public Safety expenditures per capita 
 
0.158 
(0.117) 
 
 
0.132 
(0.117) 
Average Mph over the speed limit  
 
-0.486+ 
(0.269) 
 
 
-0.456+ 
(0.255) 
Number of minority drivers stopped 
 
0.310** 
(0.112) 
 
 
0.316** 
(0.113) 
Total registered vehicles per capita  
 
-23.589** 
(8.208) 
 
 
-24.366** 
(8.237) 
Average age of stopped drivers  
 
0.070 
(0.121) 
 
 
0.061 
(0.119) 
Number of female stopped drivers 
 
0.459*  
(0.178) 
 
 
0.460*  
(0.178) 
Chapter 90 Highway funding per mile  
 
-0.046 
(0.027)+ 
 
 
-0.044 
(0.027) 
Unemployment 
 
0.127 
(0.029)** 
 
 
0.127** 
(0.030) 
Property Value per capita  
 
0.529 
(0.397) 
 
 
0.571 
(0.435) 
Population 
 
-26.774+ 
(15.566) 
 
 
-29.179+ 
(16.072) 
Constant 81.210** 
(3.078) 
586.509+ 
(310.827) 
 -17.150 
(11.074) 
624.510*  
(317.318) 
Town and month fixed effect? Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap  F-Stat   14.02   18.66 
N 7080 7038  7080 7038 
R-squared 0.85 0.93  0.92 0.93 
Robust standard errors, clustered by municipality, in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; 
** significant at 1%. Town and month fixed effect include 338 municipalities and 21 ind ividually coded 
months.   
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Table 3  
Effects of Traffic Enforcement on Accidents  
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Crashes  Crashes per 1000 capita  
 OLS OLS IV IV  OLS OLS IV IV 
Tickets 0.074+ 
(0.040) 
-0.055**  
(0.017) 
-0.143**  
(0.024) 
-0.145**  
(0.015) 
 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001*  
(2.9E-4) 
-0.002*  
(0.001) 
-0.002**  
(4.4E-4) 
Out of Town Drivers Stopped 0.045 
(0.053) 
0.039** 
(0.012) 
0.061** 
(0.016) 
0.062** 
(0.015) 
 
0.004** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
Other Public Safety expenditures per 
capita 
0.035 
(0.041) 
0.062 
(0.063) 
0.072 
(0.058) 
0.073 
(0.058) 
 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
Average Mph over the speed limit  -0.034 
(0.299) 
-0.039 
(0.084) 
-0.076 
(0.087) 
-0.077 
(0.086) 
 
-0.004 
(0.013) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
Number of minority drivers stopped -0.281**  
(0.096) 
0.013 
(0.029) 
0.040 
(0.027) 
0.040 
(0.026) 
 
-0.004**  
(0.001) 
-6.6E-5 
(4.4E-4) 
4.0E-4 
(0.001) 
3.0E-4 
(0.001) 
Total registered vehicles per capita  14.689 
(10.521) 
11.842** 
(3.327) 
9.609** 
(3.270) 
9.545** 
(3.265) 
 
0.857*  
(0.371) 
0.491+ 
(0.285) 
0.453 
(0.277) 
0.461+ 
(0.279) 
Average age of stopped drivers  0.221+ 
(0.117) 
-0.007 
(0.031) 
0.001 
(0.034) 
0.001 
(0.034) 
 
0.013+ 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
Number of female stopped drivers 0.026 
(0.086) 
0.002 
(0.023) 
0.044 
(0.029) 
0.046 
(0.030) 
 
-0.004*  
(0.002) 
-0.002+ 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Chapter 90 Highway funding per mile  0.002 
(0.003) 
0.018+ 
(0.010) 
0.014+ 
(0.008) 
0.013+ 
(0.008) 
 
1.2E-4 
(8.6E-5) 
3.7E-4 
(3.8E-4) 
2.9E-4 
(3.4E-4) 
3.0E-4 
(3.5E-4) 
Unemployment  0.041** 
(0.010) 
0.004 
(0.012) 
0.014 
(0.012) 
0.015 
(0.012) 
 
0.001** 
(1.5E-4) 
1.2E-6 
(1.4E-4) 
1.8E-4 
(1.8E-4) 
1.5E-4 
(1.6E-4) 
Property Value per capita  -0.051 
(0.068) 
0.040 
(0.112) 
0.086 
(0.101) 
0.088 
(0.101) 
 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
2.7E-4 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
Population 1.307** 
(0.492) 
7.808 
(10.056) 
5.934 
(9.496) 
5.880 
(9.472) 
 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
0.120 
(0.163) 
0.088 
(0.156) 
0.095 
(0.154) 
Constant -34.133*  
(13.947) 
-180.238 
(185.797) 
   
-0.305 
(0.624) 
-2.581 
(3.002) 
  
Kleibergen-Paap  F-Stat    14.02 18.66    14.02 18.66 
Overidentify ing Restrict ions (p value)   0.75 0.86    0.79 0.92 
Anderson-Rubin    p<0.001 p<0.001    p<0.001 p<0.001 
Month fixed effect?  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Town fixed effect? No Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.80 0.95    0.14 0.62   
N = 7,038. Robust standard errors, clustered by municipality, in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Town and month fixed effect include 
338 municipalit ies and 21 indiv idually coded months . The first stage for columns 3 and 7 is column 2 in Table 2, and the first stage for columns 4 and 8 is Table 2, column 4.  
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Table 4  
Effect of Traffic Enforcement on Injuries and Fatalities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Injuries Injuries Injuries Injuries per 1000 cap ita  Fatalit ies Fatalit ies Fatalit ies Fatalit ies per 1000 capita 
 OLS OLS IV IV  OLS OLS IV IV 
Tickets 0.017 
(0.022) 
-0.027**  
(0.009) 
-0.056**  
(0.017) 
-1.4E-4 
(3.6E-4) 
 
-2.8E-4 
(2.3E-4) 
-3.6E-4 
(2.9E-4) 
-0.001+ 
(0.001) 
1.5E-5 
(2.8E-5) 
Out of Town Drivers Stopped 0.040 
(0.026) 
0.026** 
(0.007) 
0.033** 
(0.009) 
0.001** 
(4.2E-4) 
 
1.9E-4 
(1.6E-4) 
2.4E-4 
(2.4E-4) 
3.3E-4 
(2.9E-4) 
1.0E-5 
(1.6E-5) 
Other Public Safety expenditures per capita 0.004 
(0.016) 
0.026 
(0.031) 
0.029 
(0.029) 
-2.7E-4 
(0.002) 
 
-2.2E-4 
(1.8E-4) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-9.1E-5 
(1.2E-4) 
Average Mph over the speed limit  0.043 
(0.127) 
0.014 
(0.047) 
0.002 
(0.048) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
 
2.1E-4 
(0.002) 
-0.003+ 
(0.002) 
-0.004*  
(0.002) 
-0.001**  
(2.7E-4) 
Number of minority drivers stopped -0.036 
(0.055) 
-0.012 
(0.024) 
-0.003 
(0.021) 
-3.7E-4 
(3E-4) 
 
6.3E-5 
(1.9E-4) 
3.9E-4 
(3.0E-4) 
0.001+ 
(3.6E-4) 
-7.63E-6 
(1.4E-5) 
Total registered vehicles per capita  3.967 
(5.164) 
9.933** 
(2.419) 
9.186** 
(2.382) 
0.625** 
(0.236) 
 
0.141** 
(0.039) 
-0.071 
(0.109) 
-0.085 
(0.106) 
0.020 
(0.014) 
Average age of stopped drivers  0.099*  
(0.045) 
-0.014 
(0.018) 
-0.011 
(0.018) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-2.6E-4 
(1.8E-4) 
Number of female stopped drivers -0.052 
(0.033) 
-0.002 
(0.017) 
0.012 
(0.019) 
-0.001*  
(0.001) 
 
6.6E-5 
(4.5E-4) 
-1.8E-4 
(0.001) 
-7.5E-6 
(0.001) 
-2.9E-5 
(2.7e-5) 
Chapter 90 Highway funding per mile  -0.001 
(0.002) 
0.009+ 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
1.2E-4 
(1.2E-4) 
 
-4.3E-5**  
(1.1E-5) 
2.9E-5 
(6.3E-4) 
-9.9E-6 
(6.8E-5) 
-5.4E-7 
(4.5E-6) 
Unemployment  0.020** 
(0.006) 
-0.010*  
(0.005) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
-6.4E-5 
(7.7E-5) 
 
3.4E-5 
(3.7E-5) 
8.2E-5 
(7.3E-5) 
1.3E-4+ 
(9.9E-5) 
-4.0E-6 
(4.1E-6) 
Property Value per capita  -0.024 
(0.030) 
0.046 
(0.051) 
0.062 
(0.047) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
 
-0.001*  
(3.6E-4) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(4.4E-4) 
Population 0.442+ 
(0.266) 
1.004 
(4.380) 
0.377 
(4.181) 
-0.066 
(0.075) 
 
0.006** 
(0.001) 
-0.024 
(0.059) 
-0.036 
(0.058) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Constant -4.816 
(5.573) 
-39.499 
(79.023) 
   
0.030 
(0.072) 
0.574 
(1.134) 
  
Kleibergen-Paap  F-Stat   14.02  14.02    14.02  14.02 
Overidentify ing Restrict ions (p value)   0.75  0.41    0.77  0.72 
Anderson-Rubin Wald   p<0.001 p<0.001    p<0.001 p<0.001 
Month fixed effect?  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Town fixed effect? No Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.73 0.91    0.11 0.17   
N = 7,038. Robust standard errors, clustered by municipality, in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Town and month fixed effect include 
338 municipalit ies and 21 indiv idually coded months. The first stage for columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 is Table 2, co lumn 2. Results are very similar to these results when the first stage is 
Table 2, column 4.  
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Table 5  
Override Referenda and Traffic Tickets  to Drivers Under 30  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS  OLS OLS 
Override Pass -7.348**  
(2.243) 
-5.098**  
(1.288) 
 -1.301 
(2.303) 
-1.146 
(2.120) 
Override Fail -4.947 
(3.913) 
-1.756 
(2.473) 
 -8.068**  
(3.020) 
-9.038**  
(3.434) 
Override Pass Dollars 0.832** 
(0.191) 
0.600** 
(0.086) 
 0.181+ 
(0.095) 
0.218*  
(0.102) 
Override Fail Dollars 0.035 
(0.027) 
0.049*  
(0.022) 
 0.035+ 
(0.019) 
0.062** 
(0.023) 
Out of Town Drivers Stopped * Override Pass    -0.025 
(0.025) 
-0.023 
(0.021) 
Out of Town Drivers Stopped * Override Fail    0.060** 
(0.023) 
0.078** 
(0.021) 
Out of Town Drivers Stopped * Override Pass Dollars     0.001*  
(0.000) 
0.001** 
(0.000) 
Out of Town Drivers Stopped * Override Fail Dollars   0.098** 
(0.034) 
 0.231** 
(0.030) 
0.097** 
(0.034) 
Out of Town Drivers Stopped  0.058 
(0.052) 
  0.049 
(0.052) 
Other Public Safety expenditures per capita  -0.180 
(0.126) 
  -0.177 
(0.122) 
Average Mph over the speed limit   0.216** 
(0.046) 
  0.217** 
(0.046) 
Number of minority drivers stopped  -6.939+ 
(3.796) 
  -7.139+ 
(3.756) 
Total registered vehicles per capita   -0.576**  
(0.086) 
  -0.579**  
(0.085) 
Average age of stopped drivers   0.180*  
(0.087) 
  0.180*  
(0.087) 
Number of female stopped drivers  -0.015 
(0.011) 
  -0.015 
(0.011) 
Chapter 90 Highway funding per mile   0.057** 
(0.017) 
  0.057** 
(0.017) 
Unemployment   0.204 
(0.173) 
  0.216 
(0.183) 
Property Value per capita   -10.617 
(6.672) 
  -11.133 
(6.813) 
Population 39.570** 
(1.402) 
243.072+ 
(132.021) 
 -3.367 
(5.456) 
251.353+ 
(133.954) 
Constant -7.348**  
(2.243) 
-5.098**  
(1.288) 
 -1.301 
(2.303) 
-1.146 
(2.120) 
Town and month fixed effect? Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap  F-Stat   14.49   12.11 
N 7080 7038  7080 7038 
R-squared 0.86 0.93  0.91 0.93 
Robust standard errors, clustered by municipality, in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; 
** significant at 1%. Town and month fixed effect include 338 municipalities and 21 ind ividually coded 
months.   
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Table 6  
Effect for Traffic Enforcement on Accidents for Drivers under 30 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Crashes  Crashes per 1000capita 
 OLS OLS IV IV  OLS OLS IV IV 
<30 Tickets 0.128 
(0.089) 
-0.084+ 
(0.051) 
-0.504**  
(0.090) 
-0.470**  
(0.080) 
 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.007*  
(0.003) 
-0.005+ 
(0.004) 
Out of Town Drivers Stopped 0.055 
(0.052) 
0.034** 
(0.013) 
0.075** 
(0.022) 
0.072** 
(0.021) 
 
0.004** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
Other Public Safety expenditures per capita 0.035 
(0.040) 
0.059 
(0.064) 
0.079 
(0.057) 
0.078 
(0.057) 
 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
Average Mph over the speed limit  -0.038 
(0.305) 
-0.029 
(0.085) 
-0.096 
(0.102) 
-0.091 
(0.099) 
 
-0.004 
(0.013) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
Number of minority drivers stopped -0.279**  
(0.097) 
0.014 
(0.034) 
0.104*  
(0.044) 
0.097*  
(0.042) 
 
-0.004**  
(0.001) 
-1.3E-4 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Total registered vehicles per capita  14.654 
(10.794) 
12.610** 
(3.392) 
9.447** 
(3.506) 
9.705** 
(3.470) 
 
0.855*  
(0.371) 
0.503+ 
(0.286) 
0.453 
(0.278) 
0.471+ 
(0.283) 
Average age of stopped drivers  0.362** 
(0.123) 
-0.060+ 
(0.033) 
-0.300**  
(0.069) 
-0.280**  
(0.063) 
 
0.015*  
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
4.1E-4 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
Number of female stopped drivers 0.030 
(0.074) 
-0.008 
(0.021) 
0.070 
(0.044) 
0.063 
(0.041) 
 
-0.004**  
(0.002) 
-0.002*  
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Chapter 90 Highway funding per mile  0.002 
(0.003) 
0.019+ 
(0.011) 
0.012 
(0.008) 
0.013+ 
(0.008) 
 
1.2E-4 
(8.7E-5) 
3.9E-4 
(3.9E-4) 
2.8E-4 
(3.3E-4) 
3.2E-4 
(3.5E-4) 
Unemployment  0.040** 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.012) 
0.025+ 
(0.015) 
0.023 
(0.015) 
 
0.001** 
(1.4E-4) 
-4.1E-5 
(1.4E-4) 
3.2E-4 
(2.5E-4) 
1.9E-4 
(2.4E-4) 
Property Value per capita  -0.049 
(0.069) 
0.028 
(0.115) 
0.108 
(0.106) 
0.102 
(0.104) 
 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
7.5E-5 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
Population 1.313** 
(0.491) 
8.215 
(10.288) 
4.371 
(9.800) 
4.685 
(9.792) 
 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
0.128 
(0.165) 
0.068 
(0.159) 
0.089 
(0.157) 
Constant -40.997** 
(14.051) 
-189.598 
(190.717) 
   
-0.400 
(0.619) 
-2.766 
(3.044) 
  
Kleibergen-Paap  F-Stat   14.49 12.11    14.49 12.11 
Overidentify ing Restrict ions (p value)   0.96 0.35    0.80 0.92 
Anderson-Rubin  Wald    p<0.001 p<0.001    p<0.001 p<0.001 
Month fixed effect?  Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Town fixed effect? No Yes Yes   No Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.80 0.95    0.15 0.62   
N = 7,038. Robust standard errors, clustered by municipality, in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Town and month fi xed effect include 
338 municipalit ies and 21 indiv idually coded months. The first stage for columns 3 and 7 is column 2 in Table 5, and the first stage for columns 4 and 8 is Table 5, column 4.   
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Table 7 
Effect for Traffic Enforcement on Injuries and Fatalities for Drivers under 30  
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Injuries Injuries Injuries Injuries per 
1000 capita  
 Fatalit ies Fatalit ies Fatalit ies Fatalit ies per 1000 capita 
 
OLS OLS IV IV  OLS OLS IV IV 
< 30 Tickets 0.013 
(0.042) 
-0.030 
(0.025) 
-0.199**  
(0.065) 
-4.2E-4 
(0.001) 
 
-3.4E-4 
(3.9E-4) 
-4.7E-4 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-4.2E-4 
(0.001) 
Out of Town Drivers Stopped 0.043 
(0.026) 
0.022** 
(0.008) 
0.039** 
(0.012) 
0.001** 
(4.3E-4) 
 
1.4E-4 
(1.6E-4) 
2.0E-4 
(2.3E-4) 
3.9E-4 
(3.6E-4) 
0.001** 
(4.0E-4) 
Other Public Safety 
expenditures per capita 
0.003 
(0.016) 
0.024 
(0.032) 
0.032 
(0.029) 
-2.6E-4 
(0.002) 
 
-2.2E-4 
(1.8E-4) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-2.6E-4 
(0.002) 
Average Mph over the speed 
limit   
0.043 
(0.128) 
0.021 
(0.047) 
-0.006 
(0.055) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
 
2.3E-4 
(0.002) 
-0.003+ 
(0.002) 
-0.004+ 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
Number of minority drivers 
stopped 
-0.035 
(0.055) 
-0.013 
(0.027) 
0.023 
(0.031) 
-3.2E-4 
(4.1E-4) 
 
4.6E-5 
(2.0E-4) 
3.7E-4 
(3.1E-4) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-3.2E-4 
(4.1E-4) 
Total registered vehicles per 
capita 
3.977 
(5.207) 
10.395** 
(2.491) 
9.128** 
(2.470) 
0.630** 
(0.236) 
 
0.141** 
(0.039) 
-0.065 
(0.109) 
-0.080 
(0.107) 
0.625 
(0.236) 
Average age of stopped drivers  0.119+ 
(0.061) 
-0.034+ 
(0.019) 
-0.130**  
(0.044) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
 
-0.002+ 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
Number of female stopped 
drivers 
-0.044 
(0.029) 
-0.009 
(0.016) 
0.022 
(0.025) 
-0.001*  
(0.001) 
 
-1.7E-5 
(4.4E-4) 
-2.6E-4 
(0.001) 
1.0E-4 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Chapter 90 Highway funding 
per mile  
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.010+ 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.004) 
1.2E-4 
(1.2E-4) 
 
-4.4E-5**  
(1.1E-5) 
3.8E-5 
(6.5E-5) 
5.1E-6 
(7.2E-5) 
1.1E-4 
(1.2E-4) 
Unemployment  0.021** 
(0.007) 
-0.012*  
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
-5.8E-5 
(9.6E-5) 
 
3.0E-5 
(3.7E-5) 
6.5E-5 
(7.0E-5) 
1.7E-4 
(1.5E-4) 
-5.8E-5 
(9.6E-5) 
Property Value per capita  -0.023 
(0.031) 
0.038 
(0.053) 
0.070 
(0.048) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
 
-0.001*  
(3.7E-4) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
Population 0.432 
(0.274) 
1.306 
(4.454) 
-0.233 
(4.349) 
-0.067 
(0.075) 
 
0.007** 
(0.001) 
-0.021 
(0.059) 
-0.039 
(0.063) 
0.067 
(0.075) 
Constant -6.100 
(5.805) 
-46.577 
(80.903) 
   
-0.053 
(0.069) 
0.495 
(1.131) 
  
Kleibergen-Paap  F-Stat   14.49 14.49    14.49 14.49 
Overidentify ing Restrict ions (p 
value) 
  
0.70 0.40    0.78 0.40 
Anderson-Rubin Wald    p<0.001 p<0.001    p<0.001 p<0.001 
Month fixed effect?  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Town fixed effect? No Yes Yes   No Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.72 0.91    0.11 0.17   
N = 7,038. Robust standard errors, clustered by municipality, in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Town and month fixed effect include 
338 municipalit ies and 21 indiv idually coded months. The first stage for columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 is Table 5, co lumn 2. Results are very similar to these results when the first stage is 
Table 5, column 4.  
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     Appendix 
 
 
Table A1 
Breakdown of Twenty Most Common Violations* 
Ticket Description Frequency Percent of Total 
Speeding 238,234 38.48% 
Seat Belt Violation 82,622 13.35% 
Failure To Stop 72,178 11.66% 
No Inspection Sticker 53,923 8.71% 
Unregistered / Improper Equipment 23,945 3.87% 
No Registration or License 19,676 3.18% 
Improper Equipment 12,733 2.06% 
Lane Violation 10,274 1.66% 
Minor Traffic 10,112 1.63% 
Fail To Use Safety 10,103 1.63% 
Illegal Operation 9,305 1.50% 
Street Highway Violation 9,277 1.50% 
Right of Way Intersection 7,339 1.19% 
Display Number Plate 5,241 0.85% 
DPW State Highway Regulations 5,061 0.82% 
Keep Right / No View 4,452 0.72% 
No Child Restraint 4,341 0.70% 
Improper Passing 3,785 0.61% 
Fail to Yield to Pedestrian 3,073 0.50% 
Impeding Operation 2,900 0.47% 
* These violations account for 95% of the 619,104 traffic tickets issued by local officers 
from April 1, 2001 until January 31,2003.  
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Table A2. Out of Town Drivers on the Road for the January1, 2002 through January 31, 200 3 
 Out of Town 
Drivers 
(Percent) 
Local Drivers Drivers’ 
Hometown 
Unidentified in 
Data Set 
Total 
Tickets  
(Recipient) 
250,413 (67%) 123,640 (33%) 0 374,053  
Crashes 
(Participants) 
111,287 
(78%)† 
30,548 
(21.5%) 
250 (0.5%) 142,085  
†Crashes that involve 1 or more out of town drivers are counted as “Out of Town Driver” 
Crashes 
 
